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Metaphysical and Cultural Nature 
of Sacrifice in the Life and Death 
of E. Stein and S. Weil
A B S T RAC T
The article explains the metaphysical, culture‑making and creative act 
sacrificing one’s own life in the name of higher values. At the beginning 
we discuss the causes of a contemporary cultural crisis and the disap-
pearance of metaphysical attitudes. We have formulated a thesis that 
the revival of metaphysics in contemporary culture can be  grounded 
in the experience of metaphysical qualities that are present in heroic 
acts of offering one’s own life for another. The next step in our analysis 
was to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for self‑sacrifice, 
and then, on the examples of E. Stein and S. Weil, we show what the 
ultimate sacrifice of one’s own life is. Using the method of humanis-
tic interpretation, we have reconstructed the descriptive and normative 
reasons which motivated the two women to their acts of self‑sacrifice. 
And although Weil and Stein do not meet the criteria to be categorized 
as self‑sacrifices, we have found that they indeed were ultimate sacri-
fices because they were directed towards the realization of the highest 
moral and religious ideals. Using the category of “metaphysical quali-
ties” developed by the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, we 
proposed an interpretation in which the sacrificial act was interpreted 
as supererogation in which metaphysical qualities such as holiness, 
sublimity, etc. are phenomenologically present. Such an act also has 
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a  cultural‑creative dimension, consisting in building a  culture and 
civili zation of life in which the value of the existence of another human 
being is a correlate of a metaphysical desire rather than biological and 
psychological needs. The thesis is that, contrary to the contemporary 
crisis in metaphysics and axiology, they are essential and irremovable 
elements of culture, without which it cannot grow properly.
K E Y  W O R D S :  philosophy of humanities, sacrifice, gift, Simone 
Weil, Edith Stein, humanistic interpretation, 
supererogation
S T R E S Z C Z E N I E
Metafizyczno-kulturotwórczy charakter ofiary na przykładzie życia 
i śmierci E. Stein i S. Weil
W artykule objaśniamy, na czym polega metafizyczny i kulturotwór-
czy sens aktu ofiary dokonanego z własnego życia w imię wyższych 
wartości. Na początku omówiliśmy przyczyny współczesnego kryzy-
su kultury i  zaniku postaw metafizycznych. Sformułowaliśmy tezę, 
że odrodzenie metafizyki we współczesnej kulturze może być ugrun-
towane w  doświadczeniu jakości metafizycznych, które uobecniają 
się w  czynach heroicznych polegających na złożeniu ofiary z  włas-
nego życia za drugiego człowieka. Następnym krokiem w  naszych 
analizach było określenie koniecznych i  wystarczających warun-
ków do bycia ofiarą, a dalej na przykładzie E. Stein oraz S. Weil po-
kazaliśmy, czym jest ofiara absolutna z własnego życia. Przy pomocy 
metody interpretacji humanistycznej zrekonstruowaliśmy przesłan-
ki opisowe i  normatywne, które zmotywowały owe kobiety do pod-
jęcia czynu ofiarniczego. I choć ofiary Weil i Stein nie spełniają po-
danych kryteriów umożliwiających zaliczenie ich czynu do kategorii 
ofiary, to jednak uznaliśmy, że są to ofiary absolutne ze względu na 
to, że były skierowane na realizację najwyższych ideałów moralnych 
i  religijnych. Wykorzystując opracowaną przez polskiego fenomeno-
loga Romana Ingardena kategorię „jakości metafizycznych”, zapro-
ponowaliśmy interpretację, w której czyn ofiarny został zinterpreto-
wany jako czyn super erogacyjny; fenomenologicznie uobecniają się 
w nim jakości metafizyczne, takie jak świętość, wzniosłość itp. Taki 
czyn ma również wymiar kulturotwórczy, polega na budowaniu kultu-
ry i cywilizacji życia, w których wartość istnienia drugiego człowieka 
jest korelatem pragnienia metafizycznego, a nie potrzeb o charakterze 
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biologicznym i psychologicznym. W artykule wykazano, że aksjologia 
i metafizyka mają do odegrania ważną rolę w przezwyciężeniu współ-
czesnego kryzysu kulturowego. 
S Ł O WA  K LU C Z E :  filozofia humanistyki, ofiara, dar, Edyta Stein, 
Simone Weil, interpretacja humanistyczna, 
supererogacja
Is there an idea of such an importance and greatness 
today at all to be worth to devote all your strength to in 
order to make it a reality?
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities 1
1. Culture and metaphysics at a crossroads 
The question asked by Robert Musil nearly a hundred years ago has not 
lost its relevance. Despite the progressing historical and cultural changes, 
we can still ask: is it worth sacrificing one’s life for lofty ideas? Is there any-
thing that makes a person not only give up the greatest gift that is life but 
also see it as their duty? Referring to the words of the Austrian writer, we 
will focus here on contemporary culture, where we can and even should 
ask about the existence of great ideas, especially those derived from the 
metaphysical reflection that shaped Western culture. Surely, we can say 
that modern culture is not conducive to the development of metaphysi-
cal reflection, leaving man facing the crisis, which has already begun in 
the nineteenth century thanks to the masters of suspicion (Marx, Freud, 
or Nietzsche) and continued in the twentieth century brought about by 
postmodernists and poststructuralists. 2 Using the term “contemporary 
1 R. Musil, Człowiek bez właściwości, transl. by K. Radziwił, K. Truchanowski, J. Zeltert, Vol. I, 
Warszawa 1971, p. 35. 
2 “Because metaphysics is passing, it is gone. The past does not exclude, but it does include the 
fact that it is only now that metaphysics takes absolute power in the very being and as such in 
the untruthless shape of the real and the objects. Experienced at the beginning of the begin-
ning, metaphysics is also past in the sense that it has entered into its running‑out. The running-
-out lasts longer than the last previous history of metaphysics ... Since man is the most impor-
tant raw material, one can reckon with the fact that on the basis of today’s chemical research 
factories will be built in the future to artificially produce human material ... (One should not 
resort to differences that no longer exist out of outdated prudery. The demand for human ma-
terial is subject to the same rules of ordering as the demand for entertainment books and poetry, 
for the production of which the poet is no more important than a bookbinding apprentice who 
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culture,” we can speak of a multitude of meanings of this term, in which 
they are conditioned by the assumptions and concepts adopted. We will not 
cite all definitions of contemporary culture, nor will we attempt to demon‑
strate its negative assessment, or try to highlight its positive aspects, but we 
will focus on answering the question: or in contemporary culture, there 
may be opportunities cheating metaphysical value, which should be ready 
to bear the sacrifice, especially the sacrifice of his own life? Talking about 
contemporary culture and the potential of a metaphysics of sacrifice there-
in, we may ask whether the human being is willing to accept a metaphysi-
cal attitude which expresses itself in the readiness to make sacrifices? 3 Or 
otherwise, can we sadly conclude that contemporary culture has focused 
solely on consumerism, in which there is no place for sacrifice? Think-
ing about the presence of metaphysical idea in modern culture we have in 
mind the cultural phenomenon that sacrifice is and its metaphysical justi-
fication. The term “culture” has about one hundred fifty different defini-
tions, which covers a wide range of phenomena and meanings. 4 The mul-
tiplicity of meanings and possibilities of interpretation results in the fact 
that we do not have a transparent definition of culture. A similar problem 
is posed by attempts to analyze the subject matter of sacrifice. The use of 
this concept in different cultural contexts proves to be ambiguous. Using 
the term “sacrifice” we refer to the definitions 5 that primarily emphasize 
helps to bind them for some company library, for example by carrying a  cardboard box for 
covers from a magazine)”. M. Heidegger, Overcoming Metaphysics, in: idem, Odczyty i rozprawy, 
transl. J. Mizera, Warszawa 2007, pp. 65, 89. 
3 Such authors as Karol Tarnowski have asked about the contemporary crisis of metaphysics: 
“Is metaphysics capable of surviving the criticism to which it has been subjected today, both by 
Heidegger and by Anglo‑Saxon philosophers? To survive not in the sense of the sclerotic tena-
city of certain forms of thinking envisaged by Heidegger, but to somehow prove the legitimacy 
of questions and experiences on which metaphysics is based?”, in: Człowiek i transcendencja, 
Kraków 1995, p. 125.
4 Cf. A. Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa. Krytyka i obrona, Warszawa 1964; A. Kłoskowska, Socjolo-
gia kultury, Warszawa 2007; Z. Bauman, Kultura jako praxis, Warszawa 2012; G. Simmel, Filo-
zofia kultury, Kraków 2007; R. Benedict, Wzory kultury, Warszawa 2002; M. Gruchola, Kultura 
w ujęciu socjologicznym, “Roczniki Kulturoznawcze,” Vol. 10, 2010. 
5 Józef Tischner believes that sacrifice in Christianity was most fully revealed in Christ’s death 
on the cross: “sacrifice is more than just cruelty. It shines with additional splendor and sheds 
light on dedication, which has become a great human possibility. Sacrifice means pain and me-
aningful death. It makes sense that the victim grows out the cruelty. Man is capable of being 
a sacrifice. Actually, only man,” in: J. Tischner, Myślenie w żywiole piękna, Kraków 2013, p. 307. 
According to the philosopher, the idea of sacrifice confronts us with drastic situation. As an 
example, Tischner gives making a sacrifice to buy out a slave. “A slave is not able to redeem 
himself from the bondage; there must be a person who will have such opportunities. By making 
the sacrifice, they becomes a savior, but the act of redemption, in a sense, becomes an act di-
rected against one’s self. Redemption of a slave is not a purchase, but liberation. This dramatic 
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its voluntary nature, pointing to the basic conditions that must be met so 
that we can consider an act as such. Our attention should focus on the 
meaning of sacrifice as an act of supreme dedication of giving one’s own 
life with an indication of its metaphysical character. The act of sacrificing 
one’s life in the name of ideals and values places many questions about our 
existence in the world before us. Indeed, we may ask: why would sacrifice 
make metaphysical values emerge? By asking these types of questions we 
refer directly to the human being and its metaphysical desires. Although 
the term metaphysics itself is loaded with ambiguity, the  question about 
it and its presence in contemporary culture becomes indispensable in the 
context of human existence, which today lost its orientation in reality and 
is lost in the world indeed. We can formulate questions not only about the 
possibility of the existence of metaphysics, but also about its form, which 
has changed throughout history, and also about its role in contemporary 
culture. 6 Our considerations herein focus on the disappearance of the 
sense of metaphysical desire which is associated with technological pro‑
gress and the cultural changes that result from it. 7 Contemporary culture, 
despite the dynamic development of consumerism and the introduction 
of new technologies, is trying to exclude all manifestations of metaphysi-
cal reflection. 8 One that focuses only on the search for new experiences, 
drawn into the consumer chain of culture, loses themselves, and ceases 
to ask about the final overall sense of their existence and whatever will 
happen next. The present day has somehow imprisoned man in its narrow 
frames, which only seemingly seem to be wide. In fact, it offers narrow 
confines of consumerism, which is about the exchange of material goods. 
The result of such a state of human consciousness is the confession of an 
ephemeral attitude to life as the here and now. The lack of reflection on 
one’s own existence is not, however, a common phenomenon, but rather, 
understanding of sacrifice directs the thought of the philosopher into the core of the  philosophy 
of Emmanuel Lévinas. Thus understood, sacrifice becomes responsibility for another who is in 
captivity. Responsibility will always imply facing a choice, because it chooses me calling in the 
face of the Other. Taking responsibility for the Other will always eventually become a  sacrifice.” 
Ibidem.
6 Cf. J. Jusiak, Myślenie metafizyczne i niemetafizyczne, “Przegląd Filozoficzny,” Iss. 2, 1994. 
7 Cf. J. Breczko, Zanik uczuć metafizycznych jako przyczyna kryzysu kultury, “Kultura i Wartości,” 
Iss. 13, 2005. 
8 Metaphysics, despite its diverse understanding and interpretation in the history of philosophy 
and its currents, asks basic questions about being and its existence. We can say that metaphysi-
cal questions should be permanent elements of human being in the world and their role should 
be to reflect on what has not been directly given to us. As stressed by W. Stróżewski: “the task of 
metaphysics is therefore to search for the ultimate justification of reality, which particular scien-
ces are not able to satisfy.” W. Stróżewski, Ontologia, Kraków 2004, p. 39. 
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we can define it as dormant or partially marginalized. The dormant meta-
physical desire does not condemn metaphysics to exclusion, as evidenced 
by the willingness of some people to sacrifice their lives in the name of 
higher values that the tradition of the Western culture, strongly shaped by 
Christianity, has always defended. The question about metaphysics and 
its influence on culture also includes an attempt to see the conditions of 
the possibility of sacrificing one’s own life. The possibility of a  renewal 
of metaphysics is connected with asking the human person about the sense 
and ultimate destiny of their life. 9 The question of metaphysics that we 
put forward raises another, on the metaphysical desire for higher values 
in the name of which man is willing to make a sacrifice of their life. Such 
a sacrifice is an absolute testament a human being makes in the name of 
higher values. The example of sacrificing one’s own life to which we refer 
herein was motivated by a sense of solidarity with other people and an act 
of moral obligation addressed to them.
 In addressing the issue of the possibility of making a sacrifice of one’s 
life, we must pay attention to the problem of the crisis of contemporary 
culture, in which metaphysical thinking is often rejected and replaced by 
scientific thinking. In a way, Transcendence has been ostracized from the 
world. Man, in a world without metaphysics easily forgets the existence of 
another man who often requires our help. So, we may ask: is there space 
in our times, for the highest kind of sacrifice, which is giving up one’s own 
life? We shall refer to two examples—Edith Stein and Simone Weil, who 
gave a  positive answer to this question with their heroic attitudes, thus 
confirming their faithfulness to their own beliefs by making a voluntary 
sacrifice. The selection of these two women was justified not only by their 
similar life attitudes but also by other numerous analogies between them. 
The lives of both of them went on in the shadow of two world wars. They 
were both philosophers and both had Jewish roots. The biography of each 
one of them shows the desire to seek the ultimate truth that they found 
in Christianity without completely separating themselves from the reli-
gion of their ancestors. 10 However, the most important shared character-
istic by both women was their full awareness of their chosen attitude and 
the volun tariness of their sacrifice. One made hers in the Auschwitz con-
centration camp, and the other, who was suffering far from her homeland, 
died as a result of exhaustion and deliberate starvation. By discussing the 
most important events in the lives of the two heroines and then juxtaposing 
9 K.  Śnieżyński, Filozofia sensu jako odpowiedź na kryzys metafizyki. W  stronę nowej „filozofii 
pierwszej”, “Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne,” Vol. 22, 2008, p. 215. 
10 This issue is debatable in the case of talking about the attitude of Simone Weil. Cf. E. Levinas, 
Trudna wolność. Eseje o judaizmie, Warszawa 1991. 
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them with each other, we shall attempt to point out the events in their lives 
which may indicate a voluntary martyr’s journey, which may be interpret-
ed in the category of sacrifice in the name of higher values. 11 The question 
about the possibility of making a conscious self‑sacrifice is supplemented 
by another: how can we understand the “metaphysics of sacrifice”? The 
same difficulty is to name and describe something that transcends human 
thinking. We can say that metaphysics is a philosophical attempt to grasp 
what is the first and most important in reality; metaphysics is thinking in 
which the question about arche emerges. 12 We will try to demonstrate that 
the metaphysics of sacrifice has a cultural aspect. It builds a culture and 
civilization of love for another human being, which stands in stark con-
trast to the culture and civilization of death, in which terms such as sacri-
fice lose their meaning in favor of very often selfishly understood purpose 
of human life.
 In our analyses, we will basically use the method of a  broadly un-
derstood humanistic interpretation, 13 in which we take into account the 
values we experience, on top of the metaphysical and religious beliefs that 
co‑determinate the choice of our heroines’ life paths. This interpretation 
is given here to certain human activities, which on the one hand have 
11 Speaking about the biography of Stein and Weil, it is impossible not to draw attention to their 
work, in which we can also find analysis on the issue of sacrifice. Cf. S. Weil, Świadomość nad-
przyrodzona, Warszawa 1956; E. Stein, Wiedza krzyża, Kraków 2004. 
12 Cf. K. Tarnowski, Metafizyka w człowieku, “Znak,” Iss. 741, 2017. 
13 Humanistic interpretation method was developed by Jerzy Kmita in his book Z metodologicz-
nych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej [From the methodological problems of humani-
stic interpretation]. The book develops a project on the methodology of the humanities. In this 
project, Jerzy Kmita wanted to indicate what type of reasoning is used in the humanities. In his 
early works Kmita showed how humanistic interpretation takes place on examples taken from 
literature (e.g. the attitude of Antigone or the poetry of Leopold Staff). That humanistic inter-
pretation would be consistent with our everyday intuitions which concern the interpretation 
of human behavior. It is common for each of us to assume that in order to understand the me-
aning of the other person’s behavior, one must take into account his or her knowledge and axio-
logical preferences. The scheme of humanistic interpretation takes up our colloquial intuitions, 
which we associate with the understanding of the meaning of human behavior. The humanistic 
interpretation, which is a certain type of reasoning, includes three conditions: a premise that 
says that a given entity has knowledge; a premise that says that the objectives and values prefer-
red by the entity are achievable; and a premise that assumes the rationality of a given entity. Hu-
manistic interpretation underwent a kind of an evolution in the Poznan school of philoso phy. 
This has been done not only by Jerzy Kmita but also by his students. Some of them, such as. 
Prof. Pałubicka continued and developed the epistemological variant of the humanistic inter-
pretation. In contrast, Prof. Moraczewski and Prof. A. Grzegorczyk chose the phenomenologi-
cal and hermeneutic variant. We can therefore see that humanistic interpretation was extended 
with newer components, which included various cultural, humanistic facts. In our interpreta-
tion we take the broad understanding which assimilates the phenomenology. 
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a culturally creative character, while on the other hand they present high 
moral values. 14
2. Sacrifice as a supreme act of devotion
The category of “sacrifice” has numerous defining characteristics. We shall 
not recall them here, because that would take us away from the substance 
of the matter. Despite the differences in the understanding of sacrifice, it 
is undeniably a kind of death. There is a consensus among different theo-
rists who differ in detail in their understanding of what sacrifice is. Many 
theories have been developed on the subject of death and attempts to un-
derstand it. In our discussion we will focus on discussing sacrifice as an 
act of giving one’s own life in the name of values. Let us therefore refer 
to the definition of sacrifice developed by the French philosopher Gabriel 
Marcel, who claimed that sacrifice for the other cannot be understood and 
explained in a rational way. He wrote: 
To explain, we are looking for a goal, yet it is not possible to justify the sac-
rifice of life with a goal we would like to achieve. It is in the nature of sacri-
fice ... to be unable to give an account of oneself. In a purely human sense, 
it is madness, but at the same time the human being feels a moral compul-
sion not to retreat from it; he or she knows that if they had not made sac-
rifices, they would have humiliated themselves, so she or he has no choice. 
But sacrifice is not self‑cancellation (like suicide), but the fullest affirma-
tion and salvation of one’s existence. 15
We must pay attention not only to the difficulty of talking about sacri-
fice due to the lack of clear definitions, but also to the fact of experienc-
ing death which we have not been able to know empirically. Dedication 
of one’s own life is a deeply personal act. It is difficult to argue with such 
a free decision. The act of giving one’s own life in which another person 
was not saved may raise many doubts about the rightness of such behavior. 
In our analysis, we want to draw attention to the conditions that should be 
met by an act that could be classified as a sacrifice. These are:
1. in human nature there is a  constant desire to stay alive, which 
does not mean that man is unable to sacrifice life in the name of 
ideas and values that they consider absolute. The who sacrifices 
14 Cf. J.  Kmita, Z  metodologicznych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej, Warszawa 1971; 
cf. A. Grzegorczyk, Źródła sensu w humanistyce, Kęty 2018. 
15 I. Ziemiński, Metafizyka śmierci, Kraków 2010, p. 267. 
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themselves does not make it because of hating life or because of 
a death wish. 16 Someone who offers their life may even hate death 
and desire to continue to live, but when put in a situation where 
they have to make a choice, they prefer to die voluntarily.
2. death which takes the form of sacrifice involves not only the love and 
respect for life but also self‑love. 17 As pointed out by Ireneusz Zie-
miński a person who has a problem with accepting them selves will 
not be not able to commit the absolute act of self‑sacrifice. Their 
death would be a contradiction rather than a voluntary sacrifice. Self-
‑hate and the desire for death would become a self‑destructive act, 
which does not defend any value but denies their existence. Sacri fice 
is not an act which aims to destroy this life is but an affirmation of 
the infinite meaning, in a way expressed fully by metaphysics.
3. it is also the most complete act of self‑affirmation of a person who 
dedicates themselves in an absolute way, confirming their value. We 
can therefore conclude that death as a sacrifice is only possible if the 
person sees the value of themselves and their existence. Death, in 
which nothing is sacrificed, cannot be called a sacrifice. 18
4. death, which takes the form of a sacrifice although it is related to al-
truism, can only become its false form, in which the only good and 
purpose of action is that of others.
5. also, when we consider an act of sacrifice that aims to external-
ly manifest contempt for death, it becomes merely a caricature of 
sacrifice. 19
 We pointed out above that there are many examples that fit into the 
category of sacrifice, but in our discussion, we shall focus on its ultimate 
form that is sacrificing one’s own life. We can reflect and seek answers to 
the question: what are the motives to take such action? Certainly, we are 
not able to point to a single transparent answer. We can assume that one 
of the factors is a metaphysical desire, which is always present in human 
nature. Human beings as finite creatures ask questions about their duties, 
the power of striving for good, which causes constant tension between ab-
solutely finite experiences and infinite aspirations, and makes them search 
for ultimate meaning. This internal conflict cannot be resolved by itself. 
This forces man to constantly strive for something that is unexplored, to go 
16 Such accusations are made towards the death of Simone Weil, recognizing her hunger for ritual 
suicide based on the model of the Cathars. Cf. M. Barber, Katarzy, Warszawa 2005. 
17 Ana Rand argues with this view, showing that ethical selfishness and self‑respect preclude an 
act of sacrifice. Cf. A. Rand, Cnota egoizmu. Nowa koncepcja egoizmu, Poznań 2000. 
18 I. Ziemiński, Metafizyka śmierci, op. cit., p. 241. 
19 Ibidem. 
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beyond what is earthly, sensual, and finished. 20 But this is not a death wish, 
which would help thus achieve the coveted infinity. The desire to realize 
the highest value, which is made present in the act of sacrifice is entered 
into the human nature, becoming the testimony of man striving to achieve 
a level of moral heroism. Absolute sacrifice has its own special character. It 
is not just giving up or dedication of a total of some parts, but the ending of 
one’s own life. Such an act is of highest value. As a result of it, the person is 
not able to pursue other values, because their earthly life is radically ended. 
Human resignation from one value for another is also a kind of sacrifice, 
but sacrificing one’s own life is total, absolute and final. 21 As stated by 
I. Ziemiński: 
The sacrifice of life is also individual, acting act of free and mature person. 
A person who sacrifices themselves cannot only be part of a collective but 
must be an autonomous and morally responsible entity. They only give up 
theirs in the name of absolute values or people they want to remain faith-
ful to. 22
 Sacrifice is an individual decision which is characterized by a volun-
tary act. 23 We cannot talk about sacrifice in the case of those who give up 
their lives only because of the influence of a group, or falsely understood 
20 K. Śnieżyński, Metafizyka dla człowieka a nie człowiek dla metafizyki: kilka uwag o potrzebie my-
ślenia metafizycznego we współczesności, in: Wobec metafizyki: filozofia – sztuka – film, Kraków 
2012, p. 17
21 I. Ziemiński, Metafizyka śmierci, op. cit., p. 242. 
22 Ibidem. 
23 When talking about sacrifice, our greatest attention should be focused on its ethical aspect, 
which emphasizes that it is a conscious and motivated act. It should also be distinguished from 
the notion of renunciation or resignation, which may indirectly be associated with it. A sacri-
fice consists in refraining from realizing some possibility that man is able to realize. A person 
is only able to renounce what lies in his or her disposable abilities. Resignation, in turn, takes 
place when a person forced by external circumstances to renounce certain values, tendencies 
or desires, etc. Sacrifice is more than just renunciation or resignation. Sacrifice is associated 
with moral activity, or with restoring something that was previously neglected. It is characteri-
zed by deliberate action that goes beyond individual human dimension of the person making 
the sacrifice. When a person renounces an opportunity, gives up an important cause, sacrifices 
some goods for the benefit of others, and sometimes even their own life; all such actions, which 
are intended to benefit an individual or society, whether they are realized or not, can be called 
a sacri fice. A person making sacrifice sets out an aim to make a difference in the given reality, 
and in a broader context and also for the future. Sacrificial acts open up for individual or social 
purposes; without sacrifice, they would not be possible. Sacrifice results in a loss to the subject 
who undertakes it, but at the same time it is a benefit, a value, a higher purpose, which is re-
alized by the sacrificial act. Cf. P. Schuttplez, O kilku aspektach ofiary jako zjawisku moralnym, 
“Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica,” Iss. 1, Łódź 1981, pp. 44‑45. 
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responsibility that arose as a consequence of social pressure. To make the 
absolute sacrifice, one cannot be forced by a warrant, law or moral obliga-
tion. Speaking of sacrifice, we must stress its other objective, which is the 
realization of the good that will be realized in this way. A person’s death 
will only make sense if they die consciously and voluntarily gives their 
life up for someone, that is, for another person who is always “someone” 
and never “something.” If someone gave his or her life for “something” it 
would be a misunderstanding resulting from wrongly selected values. It is 
also difficult to speak of a voluntary act of death that would not confirm 
faith in values without trying to defend them, without taking the side of 
the right cause or of the person who requires such sacrifice. It would be 
a rather absurd act of giving up one’s life, which finds no lofty justification. 
The sacrifice of life has its justification not so much in the act of sacrifice 
itself, but phenomenologically it is most present in the idea of the cause 
which it defends with a certain amount of radicalism. This may not, how-
ever be a trivial matter. The cause should be worthy and deserving of the 
highest sacrifice. Otherwise giving one’s life for a hybrid of a great cause is 
not only worthless, but a tragic mistake. 24
 The sacrifice of one’s own life, which is guided by certain values, must 
be subject to the condition of realizing something good, such as saving 
somebody, and not only by choosing sacrifice, which is not backed by the 
realization of a  specific value. We recognize that sacrifice makes sense 
only when it is given for another. Even dying in the name of patriotism, 
for one’s country, always implies dying for one’s brothers or sisters. 25 The 
reason why someone decides to make a sacrifice cannot be a negative value, 
such as avoiding evil. Self‑sacrifice cannot be justified in a sense of pride, 
rebellion, honor, audacity or selfishness that takes on a negative form. It 
must be based on respect for the value of every human existence. 26 Ac-
cording to Ziemiński, “the act of sacrifice is therefore only possible on the 
grounds of metaphysical optimism, expressed through trust in the mean-
ing of human life—one’s own and others.” 27 Another condition that is re-
quired for the category of sacrifice is seeing one’s life as a value. The type 
of existence that is the realization of values gives the possibility and moti-
vation to sacrifice oneself. Such a choice of death becomes an ultimate act 
and a complement to our life so far. 28 Voluntary death in an act of sacrifice 
24 I. Ziemiński, Metafizyka śmierci, op. cit., p. 242. 
25 Ibidem, p. 267. 
26 Ibidem, p. 243. 
27 Ibidem. 
28 Sartre compares life to a series and sees death as its element, and each of the elements thus is 
always present in all the parts of this series. However, this way of recovering death does not 
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is being faithful to oneself and the professed values. It is certainly not an 
instrumental treatment of a person. By dying to save someone else’s life, 
we become fully ourselves, and we deepen our humanity by responding to 
the momentous values that make a certain appeal to us to make them real 
in the real world. Such a sacrifice, in our opinion, does not expected to be 
repaid, recognized, or rewarded, even in the next life. 29 The self‑sacrifice of 
one’s own life in the hope of continued existence after death cannot fulfill 
the conditions for the existence of a sacrifice, since in this form it is only 
a manifestation of selfishness. By drawing attention to the conditions of 
sacrifice, we can pose the question: does every human death deserve to be 
called a sacrifice, even if it does not result in the evaluation of any human 
being? We will try to recall the most important events in the life of Edith 
Stein and Simone Weil and answer the question. 
3. Edith Stein and Simone Weil—victims 
20th century totalitarianisms?
Edith Stein and Simone Weil lived in the difficult times and witnessed 
the outbreaks of two World Wars. This experience left a stigma on their 
lives and influenced the moral stance they adopted. Both philosophers 
became heroines whose lives were marked by the stigma of the atrocity 
of war. Every one has come a difficult way in search of the truth, which 
make death something only human, it exists as something individually related to mankind, it 
becomes something mine. Through the externalized understanding of death, it gains its indi-
vidual and personal dimension, and is no longer just a great unknown. Death becomes an in-
separable phenomenon from a person’s personal life, which means that both life and death are 
events assigned to a particular individual and cannot be repeated. Man thus also becomes fully 
responsible for their life as well as for death. However, this is not a responsibility for one’s own 
death in an empirical sense, but it is a responsibility for a feature of finiteness and organici-
ty that makes life and death one’s own. Cf. J.P. Sartre, Byt i nicość, Kraków 2007, pp. 650‑652. 
29 No prospect of eternal life allows for full dedication. Man who rejects eternal life does not cal-
culate or expect that his act will be compensated. An example of such behavior is Simone Weil, 
who rejected the Christian understanding of eternal life. Weil criticized Christianity, which 
itself urged one to make to selfless self‑sacrifice in imitation of Christ, which excluded the desire 
to preserve one’s life. The thinker understands the cross as an acceptance of voluntary suffering 
without the prospect of eternal life. Cf. I. Ziemiński, Życie wieczne. Przyczynek do eschatologii 
filozoficznej, Kraków 2013, p. 76. As she herself stressed in her writings, her encounter with the 
Christian religion was hampered by her dogmas, which she radically rejected, as well as her 
faith in eternal life. The philosopher thought that the Passion and death of Jesus on the Cross 
would be enough for her in understanding and accepting Christianity; as in them and through 
them she would find the truth of Christ. Cf. S. Weil, Lettre a un religieux, Paris 1999. 
Piotr Duchliński, Agata Płazińska  – Metaphysical and Cultural Nature of Sacrifice
25
was not only a philosophical construct, but an existential matter. Despite 
their Judaic roots, each of them comes out of agnosticism and then turns 
to a philosophy that opens the way to a more complete experience of the 
truth of Christianity. However, their lives were not only a search for truth. 
They were also filled with the experience of pain, suffering and despair, 30 
which they accepted in their voluntary act and even treated them as their 
moral duty: Weil feeling obliged for the working class and France, Stein 
for Jews, Christians and Germany. Talking about them, we may experi-
ence both admiration and resentment and formulate questions about 
the desirabi lity of their behavior. In our analysis, we will try to present 
only those factors that influenced the act of self‑sacrifice by both women. 
We shall reconstruct certain conditions regarding their knowledge of the 
world and shared values. We will take into account the experience of ex-
istential philosophy and the impact of conversion to Christianity, which 
made them adopt the attitude the realization of which was sacrificing their 
lives. Then we point to analogies and differences in the type of sacrifice 
that each philosopher adopted, and we discuss the rightness of their ac-
tions. A widely applied humanistic interpretation that takes into account 
phenomenological and hermeneutical issues allows for a more complete 
picture of the sacrifice of their lives and the axiological quality that has 
been made present in their deeds. 31 
30 “Simone Weil et Edith Stein, toutes deux en des voies differentes, ont connu dans leur chair et 
leur esprit la morsurse de la souffrance. Edith Stein reste discrete et ne parlera jamais direct-
ement de sa propre souffrance. Simone Weil se confiere plus volontieres dans les pages de son 
journal, ou dans sa correspondence” (Both Simone Weil and edith Stein experienced suffering in 
different ways. Edith Stein remains discreet and never talks about her suffering in a direct way. 
Simone Weil voluntarily opens about her experience in her notes or correspondence), own trans-
lation. Cf. J.F. Thomas, Simone Weil et Edith Stein. Malheur et souffrance, Namur 1992, p. 8. 
31 In our work, we have assumed that what Simone Weil and Edith Stein did making a sacrifi-
ce of her own lives were rational acts, i.e., it was consistently carried out on the basis of their 
knowl edge and values held. Of course, one has to remember that people are not so much ratio-
nal as they have a certain tendency to act rationally. Actually, you could say that Simone Weil 
and E. Stein showed a certain tendency to act in a real way, realizing the goals they preferred 
the most. It can be said that both women were subjects of their culture, and their decisions were 
determined by the history and culture in which they lived. In this article, we assume that their 
actions showed a tendency to rational behavior, but then someone else might interpret it diffe-
rently. After all, based on e.g. on the biography of S. Weil and the available facts, one could have 
come to the conclusion that she behaved in an irrational way, e.g. by refusing to accept meals, 
going to war in Spain despite her poor health or by taking up the hardest physical work. Her act 
could not be classified as an act of sacrifice, but as a suicide. It seems that in order to grasp the 
specificity of human rationality we need not only formal criteria but we also need to broaden 
the humanistic interpretation with the components of hermeneutical and phenomenological 
methods. In the article we propose such an extended concept of interpretation showing that the 
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3.1. Edith Stein
Edith Stein, one of the twentieth century women thinkers has fascinated 
many. The life and scientific work of this Husserl disciple are a testimony 
to her consistent decisions guided by the search for truth. This unusual 
woman was characterized by Roman Ingarden: 
Edith Stein was a very gifted person, serious and responsible. I have always 
seen her as a pure person, with inner wealth and seriousness, who can be 
trusted in everything. She chose her philosophical and scientific path, and 
then her religious path consciously and felt truly happy about it, although 
in her private life she did not experience what she deserved. 32 
Edith Stein (12.10.1891 – ca. 9.08.1942) grew up in a Jewish family, where 
she was brought up in the spirit of Judaism. Despite this, at the age of four-
teen he suffered a deep existential crisis and adopted an atheistic attitude. 
Since early childhood, she showed great interest in science and an unusual 
disposition. She writes about it in her diary: 
in my dreams I always saw a bright future. I dreamed of happiness and 
fame, because I was convinced that I was made for great things, and that 
the close relations between the small bourgeoisie among whom I was born, 
did not concern me at all ... 33
After completing her studies at the University of Wroclaw she went to Göt-
tingen to take up studies in philosophy under the supervision of Edmund 
Husserl. During these studies, in addition to learning phenomenology, 
she also experienced an encounter with the Christian religion. During 
this time, many students of phenomenology experienced acts of conver-
sion, which certainly affected Stein as well. 34 Her studies in Göttingen 
Weil and Stein’s deed manifested, in the phenomenological sense, metaphysical qualities, being 
a correlate of human metaphysical desire. 
32 E. Stein, Pisma, Vol. II, transl. I. Adamska, Kraków 1982. p. 10
33 E. Stein, Dzieje pewnej żydowskiej rodziny, transl. I. Adamska, Kraków 2005, p 91.
34 We can at this point talk about a significant influence of Max Scheller on the future attitude 
of Stein: “he spoke about [Stein writes] life’s issues which are important for every man and 
which move the hearts of young people ... I do not know in what year he returned to the Catho-
lic Church. Probably, it was not very long ago. In any case, it was the time in which he dealt 
mainly with Catholic thought. He was able to convince her with the light of his spirit and the 
power of his persuasion,” W. Herbstrith, Edyta Stein. Żydówka i chrześcijanka, Kraków 2008, 
p. 48. Another person who had a great influence on Stein was Adolf Reinach, Husserl’s assis-
tant, who converted to Evangelism during World War I. At that time, the young philosopher fell 
into a crisis caused by problems with selecting material for her doctoral thesis. Stein’s mental 
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were  interrupted by the outbreak of World War I. Consequently, Stein was 
forced to return to Wroclaw. Most of her male friends go to the front and 
she also enrolls to serve in the Red Cross to join the fight on the war front. 
Because of illness, however, she is discharged from her duties and forced to 
return to Göttingen. The time spent on the front affects her understanding 
and sheds new insights into the Christian faith. As she wrote “sometimes 
with my friends go to the Protestant church. But I have not yet found my 
way to God.” 35
 In 1915, guided by a sense of solidarity with her friends fighting in the 
war, she decides to stop her resumed studies and goes back to the front as 
a nurse. Her attitude is recalled by Roman Ingarden:
she went through the whole war with the attitude of someone who is ready 
to start a one‑man campaign at any time ... She sent me letter after letter 
asking if I had the right to waste my time on philosophy and other such 
nonsense when people who I could help were dying there. 36
In 1917, Reinach died, whose death led Stein to a  breakdown. In this 
period, she also had the first religious experience, which then directed her 
towards conversion. In 1920 she visited her friends Theodora and Hedwig 
Conrad ‑Matrius. During this stay, Edith accidentally comes across the Life 
of Teresa of Jesus by St. Teresa of Ávila. The reading of the autobiography of 
the saint finally influenced her decision to move towards Christia nity. She 
wrote: “I reached for the book at random. It was titled: The Life of Teresa 
of Jesus written by herself. I began to read. I was fascinated! I read it in one 
breath to the end. When I closed it, I told myself: this is the truth,” 37 we 
read in the memoirs of Edith Stein. The influence of reading the Spa nish 
mystic led Stein to experiencing a  new truth. Hedwig Conrad ‑Martius 
mentions that her friend was an internally closed person and that the 
matter of her conversion was defined by the words Secretum meum mihi. 38 
After this event, Edith studied the Catechism and the Roman Missal avidly. 
After getting acquainted with the elements of the doctrine of the Christian 
faith, she attended mass for the first time and asked for a baptism. After the 
preparations, Edith was given the sacrament of Baptism on 1 January 1922 
state was so serious that in moments of doubt she thought of death and even suicide attempts. 
Reinach led her out of this existential crisis. Cf. E. Stein, Światłość w ciemności, Kraków 1977, 
p. 137. 
35 W. Herbstrith, Edyta Stein. Żydówka i chrześcijanka, op. cit., p. 56. 
36 F.M. Oben, Życie i dzieło św. Edyty Stein, Gdańsk 2006, p. 21. 
37 E. Stein, Światłość w ciemności, op. cit., pp. 202‑203. 
38 H. Conrad‑Martius, Moja przyjaciółka Edyta Stein, in: Edyta Stein albo filozofia i krzyż, Kraków 
1989, p. 3. 
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in Bergzabern. The godmother was her friend Hedwig. On the same day 
the future Carmelite received the sacrament of Holy Communion and the 
sacrament of Confirmation on February 2nd. 
 The conversion not only changed Stein’s view of faith and religion, 
but also led to her a  new understanding of philosophy. 39 The adoption 
of Christianity had an impact on Stein’s further life as she abandoned 
her university career and decided to join the Carmelite Order in Cologne 
taking the name of Teresa Benedict of the Cross. The Carmelite’s reli-
gious life was again interrupted with the outbreak of World War II, when 
mass persecution and extermination of Jews began. Aware of the situation 
in Germany, in self‑reflection Stein compared herself to the Old Testa-
ment’s Queen Esther. Like Esther, she wanted to sacrifice herself for her 
nation. She experienced her vision of future of martyrdom in solidarity 
with the people of Israel. She expressed this premonition of this future des-
tiny: “I am convinced that God does not call anyone for himself and that 
is an evidence of spontaneous love, when He accepts someone’s life.” 40 On 
9 June 1939 Sr. Teresa Benedict of the Cross wrote her will, in which she 
stated: 
Even now I joyfully accept the death that God has predestined me, in full 
submission to His Most Holy Will. I ask the Lord to accept my life and 
death in His honor and glory, in all the intentions of the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus and Mary, for the holy Church, and especially for the preservation, 
sanctification and perfection of our holy Order, in particular the Cologne 
Carmel and the Carmel in Echt, to the satisfaction of the unbelief of the 
Jewish people, that the Lord may be accepted by His own and His King-
dom come in glory, for saving Germany and for peace in the world, and fi-
nally for my loved ones, living and dead, and for all whom God has given 
me: that none of them may perish. 41
In these words, Edith Stein predicts her death, which will later take the 
form of the sacrifice of her life of the Jewish people and Germany. In a way, 
39 Cf. A. Grzegorczyk, Wpływ myśli E. Stein na filozofię przełomu wieków, in: Bóg i Auschwitz. 
O Edycie Stein, wizycie Benedykta XVI i Bogu w mrokach dziejów, eds. M. Deselaers, L. Łysiń, 
J. Nowak, Kraków 2007. Cf. R. Guilead, De la phenomenologie a la science de la croix, Paris 1974, 
p. 231. The author emphasizes the fact that Stein goes beyond the thought systems of Hus-
serl or Heidegger in her philosophical concept. She stresses the existence of God in human 
 thought, which would displace some philosophers. The thinker claims that human thought 
without reference to God is not able to answer questions related to the concept of nothingness 
or elusiveness. 
40 M. Titaniec, Pobłogosławiona przez krzyż, in: Szukając mistrza. Lubinieckie ślady św. Teresy Bene-
dykty od Krzyża Edyty Stein, Vol. I, ed. A. Pytlik, Lubliniec 2008, p. 47. 
41 E. Stein, Dzieje pewnej żydowskiej rodziny, op. cit., p. 578.
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she takes the sin of the Jews’ disbelief in Jesus on herself while showing 
that Christianity is a complement to Judaism: 
Your people, Lord, thy Israel
I take deep into my own heart.
Praying in secret and burning as sacrifice,
I desire to bring it to the Heart of the Savior. 42
In 1938, faced with increasing persecution of the Jewish population, Stein 
was transferred to the Dutch convent at Echt. There, in 1942, she was 
arrested by the Gestapo, together with her sister Rosa. It was then that 
she is believed to have said the significant words: “Come, let’s die for our 
people.” 43 The alleged likelihood of saving her life by fleeing to Switzer-
land remains a contentious issue to this day. During his lecture in Krakow 
in 1968, Roman Ingarden mentioned this incident: “Don’t you know? 
She was a Prussian woman, she reported herself when the order came out 
how the German subjects should surrender.” 44 However, some research-
ers point out that Ingarden did not have accurate information on the last 
months of Stein’s life, so it is important to exercise due restraint in evaluat-
ing the information he provides. Death of Edith Stein and her sister Rosa 
probably occurred on 9 August 1942 in a gas chamber of Auschwitz.
3.2. Simone Weil
Simone Weil appears to us primarily as a philosopher and social activist. 
Her philosophical thought was a  thorough analysis of the events of the 
twentieth century, in which felt the inevitability of war and its future ef-
fects. She has always aroused controversy and disputes. Some believe that 
her views are heretical in nature, others that they express the attitude of 
holiness. Without a doubt, Weil was full of contrasts. Certainly, with her 
thought and attitude she was ahead of her times and she has left a mark 
on the consciousness of the next generations that are pondering her reflec-
tions. In spite of a broad and in‑depth analysis of reality, interpersonal re-
lations, politics, and religion she never developed a single clear philosophi‑
cal path, which, however, does not prove her intellectual negligence, but, 
on the contrary, in this case, it is the evidence of her huge erudition. The 
42 E. Stein, Światłość w ciemności, op. cit., p. 282.
43 E. Stein, Dzieje pewnej żydowskiej rodziny, op. cit., p. 575; R. Ingarden in: E. Stein, O  zagadnieniu 
wczucia, Kraków 1988, p. 165.
44 Ibidem, p. 161.
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philosopher’s writings do not provide clear answers, putting the reader in 
doubt about his or her own existence, faith and love for the neighbor, to 
whom the author gave herself away without any limits. Weil’s life is not 
just about practicing philosophy, it is about political, social and spiritu-
al engagement. Her philosophical thought does not fit in any of the aca-
demic trends. Philosophy was for Weil a life path that she consistently fol-
lowed, as ancient thinkers did. 
 The French philosopher was born on 3 February 1909 in Paris. She 
came from an assimilated Jewish family and was raised in an atmosphere 
of agnosticism. She received a  solid education in one of the best high 
schools in Paris and then studied philosophy with passion and commit-
ment with her master Emil Chartie. After graduating from Ecole Nor-
male Superieure, she worked as a Greek language and philosophy teacher. 
In 1934 she abandoned her work as an educator and became employed as 
a factory worker in the Renault and Alsthom in Paris. In 1935 she went to 
Spain, to take part in the Civil War as a nurse. She did not learn about her 
Jewish origins until 1940, after the defeat of France, when regulations con-
cerning repression of Jews were issued. As a Jew, she confessed Christia nity 
but without receiving the sacrament of baptism. She always considered 
herself “a disciple of Christ outside the Church.” The year 1940, when 
she first saw a procession of women praying for her dead husbands during 
her stay in Portugal, was the point at which she saw her religious turn. Of 
course, this is one of the many ways of interpretation and explanation that 
speaks of the motives behind S. Weil’s turn to Christ. But we cannot con-
sider this interpretation to be absolutely certain. Despite her growing fas-
cination with Christianity she refused to accept the sacrament of baptism. 
As she wrote: “However, in recent years this has been denied by her close 
friend Simone Deitz, who at Weil’s request baptized her in the last months 
before she died.” 45 In 1942, she went through Algeria to the United States 
and then to London. There she made contact with the Committee of Free 
France. When it turned out that it was impossible to return to France, she 
had a breakdown and fell into despair. Due to rapidly developing tubercu-
losis, she was taken to the Ashford sanatorium. In 1943 she died far from 
home at the age of thirty‑four.
 The life of the French philosopher was a path of courageous decisions 
and consistent implementation in action. One of them was the sacrifice 
she made of herself, refusing to accept meals in order to join in solidarity 
with the hungry workers. Czesław Miłosz wrote about her: 
45 J.A.  Kłoczowski, Simone Weil w  sporze z  personalizmem, in: W  kręgu inspiracji personalizmu 
etycznego. Ślipko – Tischner – Styczeń, ed. P. Duchliński, Kraków 2012, p. 147. 
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Simone Weil was one of the greatest figures which the deadly twentieth 
century gave to humanity. However, she was an unbelievable, unexpected 
and respectable character, and at the same time one that provokes opposi-
tion. Perhaps every genius imposes such contradictory feelings on people, 
although this is not certain. Simone Weil eludes all attempts at hagio-
graphic embellishment, she shocks with her scandalously “deadly” behav-
ior, makes us ask questions: why, why did she have to appear in this and 
not another era of Christianity? 46
4. Metaphysical and culture‑making nature 
of sacrifice
When we consider the question of sacrifice in Simone Weil and Edith 
Stein, we ask a question here about the advisability of human death in 
the name of the values and ideas we profess, in addition to whether the 
death of both philosophers deserves to be called sacrifice. The biogra-
phies of both recalled philosophers show a number of facts and events that 
may confirm their deaths as self‑sacrifice. The existence of both women 
also has a lasting reference in the experience of conversion, which had an 
impact on both life and death in both cases. Their sacrifice was the kind 
of dying that modeled Christ’s suffering on the Cross. We have shown 
many of the conditions of sacrifice‑making that emphasized its voluntari-
ness and the main condition that is the realization of a greater good. We 
have shown above some necessary conditions to count giving one’s life 
as a  sacrificial act. None of the philosophers really saved the life of an-
other person with their attitudes. Although this condition is not met, we 
can conclude that the women’s deaths were absolute sacrifices because 
of the value of the cause to which they sacrificed their young lives. Each of 
the women showed a strong commitment to help those in need and mani-
fested acts of profound patriotism from their early adolescent years. The 
contact with Christianity not only changed the two philosophers’ percep-
tions of philoso phy as a science, but also resulted in a profound existen-
tial experience. In her reflections, Stein points out that man is not able to 
lead a temporal life without “anchoring” themselves in eternity. The turn 
towards the Catholic faith resulted in Stein’s mystical experience, which 
is connected with suffering as an inseparable act. This suffering is volun-
tary but its experience is a way that leads one to knowledge of God. The 
suffering Stein writes about is also her existential experience, and it is this 
46 Cz. Miłosz, in: S. Weil, Wybór pism, Kraków 1991, p. 6.
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that guides her on the path of sacrifice. This type of sacrifice refers to the 
Christian message of God’s love, who, crossing all boundaries, gave His 
life for the salvation of humanity. 47 Unlike Stein, according to the inter-
pretation adopted here, Weil rejected the possibility of eternal life, which 
made her sacrifice her life for service and giving it in an act of solidarity 
with suffering workers without having a promise of continued existence 
that she considered unacceptable. In the face of the sacrifice adopted by 
the French philosopher we can discuss and formulate questions: was her 
death a ritual suicide she was aiming for or not? We believe that this in-
terpretation is wrong not only because of her rejection of the possibility 
of eternal life, but also because of her biography. Analyzing the life of the 
thinker, we see that her desire to die was rather an expression of despair at 
the impossibility of continuing the fight for her homeland than a desire to 
die for the sake of dying, which is completely unjustified. 
 In order to make the metaphysical sense of sacrifice even more evident, 
we will refer in our further interpretation to the concept of metaphysical 
quality, which Roman Ingarden used in his work on the literary work. It 
seems that the notion of “metaphysical qualities” can play a certain heu-
ristic role by providing us with a convenient tool for understanding the 
nature of sacrifice and its metaphysical sense, which constitutes a desire 
for transcendence. The philosopher characterizes these qualities as follows
there are particularly simple or derived qualities such as sublimity (of 
someone’s sacrifice) or vileness (of someone’s betrayal), tragedy (of some-
one’s defeat) or horror (of someone’s fate), what is shocking, incompre-
hensible or mysterious, demonism (of someone’s act or a person’s), ho-
liness (of someone’s life) or the opposite of it: sinfulness or “hellishness” 
(e.g. of someone’s revenge), ecstaticity (of the highest delight) or silence 
(of the ultimate relief), etc. … These qualities are not properties of certain 
objects in the normal sense of the word, nor are they properties of these 
or these mental states, but they usually manifest themselves in complex 
and often different life situations or interpersonal events, as if some special 
atmo sphere, floating above them, surrounding things and people partici-
pating in these situations, an atmosphere that permeates everything and 
illuminated everything with its light. 48
As Władysław Stróżewski emphasizes, metaphysical qualities rarely 
appear during human life. However, when it comes to their manifesta-
tion, they are able to give it a  new, deeper meaning, while at the same 
time evoking a desire and a sense of longing for them. The revelation of 
47 A. Grzegorczyk, Wpływ myśli E. Stein na filozofię przełomu, op. cit., p. 13.
48 R. Ingarden, O dziele literackim, Warszawa 1960, p. 368. 
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metaphysical quality is both the pinnacle of our life and reaches its depths 
and everything that exists. 49 Metaphysical quality is always a certain value, 
which refers to our everyday life, but we are not able to give it a concrete 
form because it escapes rational cognition. As pointed out by Ingarden: 
“...you can only see them directly, one would like to say, as if in ecstasy, on 
the basis of certain situations in which they come into being.” 50
 Referring to Ingarden’s words, we can state that metaphysical qualities 
cannot be captured by empirical cognition. The Polish phenomenologist 
limits the experience of metaphysical quality only to works of art, i.e. to 
the world of intentional awareness. It seems, however, that nothing stands 
in the way of assuming that metaphysical qualities are also present in the 
conditions of the real world, namely, in the act of sacrifice. We can pose 
the question: how are we able to recognize these qualities? Is it only our 
intuition? Are we able to capture quality in a different way? Metaphysi-
cal qualities are perceptible to man, and they reveal the hidden meaning 
of being and life and constitute it. Ingarden emphasized that in dealing 
with them one enters the source of existence. The subjective correlate for 
metaphysical qualities is desire, from which flows the intuition that cap-
tures the presence of the qualities presented. Desire is a form of experienc-
ing a certain lack of good that comes from the source of all existence and is 
made present through these metaphysical qualities, forming an axiological 
and normative order.
 In the adopted interpretation, metaphysical qualities refer to the ul-
timate source of being, which is the ultimate meaning understood as the 
God of the Christian religion. The sacrifices of Weil and Stein also reveal 
the momentous metaphysical qualities of moral heroism, which is justi-
fied by reference to this ultimate meaning. Besides heroism, other qualities 
such as sublimity, holiness, tragedy, but also silence, which, in the face of 
the experience of sacrifice, takes words away and condemns us to silence, 
are revealed. The metaphysical quality is at the same time an axiological 
quality, having a momentous and obliging character. It calls for specific ac-
tions that make its sense real in the real world. Ingarden writes: 
For it shows not only what is covered and mysterious for us in other condi-
tions, and only becomes open and visible in them, but they themselves are 
what lies at the source of being and are one of its forms. But they can only 
fully reveal themselves to us if they become a reality. 51
49 W. Stróżewski, Jakości metafizyczne, in: Od teorii literatury do ontologii świata, eds. A. Perzanow-
ski, J. Pietruszczak, Toruń 2003, p. 81. 
50 R. Ingarden, cited in: W. Stróżewski, Jakości metafizyczne, op. cit., p. 82. 
51 Ibidem.
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Metaphysical qualities are directly present in the sacrifice by a person who 
gives up their life in the name of a higher supernatural order. To perceive 
the metaphysical quality of sacrifice it requires, on the one hand, a certain 
ability to intuitively capture it, and on the other hand, a certain interpreta-
tion, which must be closely correlated with this intuition. But it is not easy 
to see this quality. It requires a certain openness and commitment from 
the subject. It demands the awakening of a metaphysical desire directed 
at the source of the ultimate meaning. After all, the subject must also have 
a certain ability to see this present quality, which is very often obscured by 
the various cultural ideals and stereotypes in circulation today. From the 
phenomenological point of view, the appearance of metaphysical quality 
evokes something of an initial emotion. This emotion knocks us out of the 
daily rhythm of life, often triggering extreme tendencies from compassion 
and solidarity with the victim to its radical rejection or denial. In order to 
experience this quality of sublimity of sacrifice, which after all is always in-
tertwined with tragedy, which causes repulsions in us, as one needs to be 
prepared for everything. It can be stated that in the act of sacrifice, in fact, 
a source of meaningfulness of all praise opens before us. Sacrifice reveals 
the infinite dimension of transcendence, it makes something from outside 
the empirical world present, forcing us to exceed our contingent needs. It 
is a trampoline enabling a jump into the source of all existence. It arouses 
a desire for the Infinite Good in us, which by making itself present chal-
lenges the temporary symmetrical axiological order.
 The question posed at the beginning of our deliberations has not only 
become a question of the individual conduct of each person, but also of 
his or her death, which is not only an inevitable act, but also permanent-
ly connected with our existence. Considering the problem of worldly life, 
we can notice that the value of our life is permanently connected with the 
moment of death. We referred to the examples of Stein and Weil’s deaths, 
which were not only acts of heroic courage but also posed questions about 
the metaphysics of our death. Are we able to think today about the meta‑
physics of death, which is permanently connected with living our lives? 
We may also ask about the character and the way we should live out our 
temporal life: is it just a time given to us here and now, or is it followed 
by something else? Another question which this reflection requires is the 
ability of man to perceive metaphysical qualities. Can we talk about a crisis 
that made us lose this ability today? We can try to find answers to these 
questions in the technological development and an ever‑stronger belief in 
pragmatic values that displace metaphysics. These reflections have raised 
a number of questions which we are not able to answer in an unambigu-
ous way, but only to consider them as a contribution to the continuation 
of such reflections. The example of women who have made a conscious 
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sacrifice in the name of their values and their compassion and duty to-
wards another person shows that metaphysical desire can be considered by 
the category of sacrifice. Both philosophers, in the attitude they adopted, 
have committed a superordinate act 52 in which the metaphysical quality 
of heroism became a reality. This deed arose from the desire to metaphy‑
sically reali ze good in a world marked by different structures of evil. The 
example of both women shows that despite the alleged crisis of great nar-
ratives in culture, we can still talk not only about metaphysical desire but 
also about the existence of momentous metaphysical values. We can state 
that the examples of the philosophers confirm not only the need for meta-
physical thinking but also the direct experience which it was expressed in 
absolute sacri fice. The example of absolute sacrifice leads us to conclude 
that the way to the renaissance of metaphysics in contemporary culture 
is to restore the ability to experience the metaphysical qualities that are 
present in  various border situations, and undoubtedly the act of sacrifice 
is such a border situ ation. In this way, sacrifice as a super‑supererogato-
ry act, which is correlated with the desire to make a higher good a reality, 
has a culturally creative capacity; it creates a certain elite culture of hero-
ism which, in spite of modern times, in which egoism seems to be domi-
nant, underlines the value of sacrifice for another person. The culture of 
holiness of life is a culture of moral heroism to which every person is in-
vited. This invitation is not a coercion, an order, but rather an offer and an 
appeal that we can use or deny without any moral consequences. We can 
ask whether contemporary culture is able to function without the moral 
values of heroism? Does the development of culture not require some-
thing more than what we can see and touch? It seems that a culture in 
which higher values are not present is doomed to destruction. As has been 
stated, man has a natural desire to be directed towards something that ex-
ceeds his natural cognitive capabilities. Man is looking for meaning, which 
cannot be closed in the area of the empirical. Sight and touch must be di-
rected towards the ultimate horizon of desire, from which comes the abso-
lute Good.
52 The category of supererogation concerns an act in which human action goes beyond one’s 
duties. It mainly refers to the moral actions of man in which his conduct has not only an altru-
istic dimension but also goes beyond obligations. Trying to identify a general definition of the 
concept supererogation we can provide: “Supererogation is action beyond what we call duty. 
Fulfilling acts of supererogation is a good thing, but not required; failure to do them is not mo-
rally wrong. According to some theories, supererogation is not possible. Most utilitarians (con-
sequentionalists) maintain that it is our duty to act in the best way. Any other action is contrary 
with duty, and therefore it is a moral evil. Kant also recognizes the obligation in such a way as to 
eliminate the possibility of supererogation,” A.M. Kaniowski, Supererogacja. Zagubiony wymiar 
etyki, Warszawa 1999, pp. 19‑20.
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5. Recapitulation 
The two women’s decisions to sacrifice of their lives were influenced by 
many factors and existential experiences. Voluntary sacrifice of one’s own 
life may be subject to criticism. For it is always possible to ask the about the 
purposefulness of Weil and Stein’s deeds, neither saved another person’s 
life. However, the heroic deaths of both women direct our attention to an-
other problem, which is the voluntary acceptance of death in the name of 
high moral ideals and values. Both Weil and Stein lived in a time of great 
value crisis caused by the disaster of two world wars. Today, we are also in 
crisis, although it manifests itself in a different way and is characterized 
by consumption and technocracy. We can reiterate the questions formu-
lated at the beginning: is there an idea in today’s culture that would be the 
reason for the ultimate sacrifice? We think we can answer in the affirma-
tive, despite the alleged discussion about the crisis of axiology and meta-
physics. The examples of S. Weil and E. Stein confirm our thesis about 
the impossibility to remove metaphysics from contemporary culture. This 
metaphysics is present precisely in sacrificial acts, in which life is sacrificed 
for the other person, who always comes to us with a face on which joy but 
also pain and suffering from entanglement in various structures of evil is 
painted. The absolute sacrifice made by the subjects of our analyses goes 
towards the invisible, exceeding the worldly good that calls for realization 
in the real world. This can only be done by a free entity that decides on its 
existence. We can say that the act of sacrificing one’s own life is certainly 
a  direction towards radical metaphysics that will not find easy recogni-
tion and understanding for among the contemporary audience, as we are 
aware. In the end, the very act of sacrifice is a mystery before which human 
reason must capitulate. Sometimes, however, it capitulates too early with-
out giving a chance for a deeper understanding of the meaning that is pre‑
sent in the sacrifice, and this is because man is deluded by various prag-
matic and utilitarian idols that divert his gaze from the absolute and direct 
his gaze towards the mundane and tangible, which can be easily seen and 
used in practice. We emphasize that such a supererogatory act is the cre-
ative ferment of the culture of moral heroism, which is the culture of life, 
that radically opposes contemporary Western culture, which is increasing-
ly taking on the face of the culture of death, in which the value of the other 
person is not a correlate of desire but of psychological and biological needs. 
A human being has a value when he or she can satisfy their functional, in-
strumental, etc. needs. The sacrificial act has not only a culturally creative 
but also metaphysical‑creative value. It makes the so‑called metaphysi-
cal qualities present, in which we can touch the origins of all real and not 
merely intentional existence. These metaphysical qualities are a correlate 
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of our basic metaphysical desires, which cannot be translated into needs. It 
is their experience that leads them to undertake heroic acts exceeding the 
symmetry of the normative orders established by man. If Stein and Weil 
had only been driven by needs in their lives, they would probably never 
have been able to do such heroic things. However, they were motivated, 
according to our interpretation, by metaphysical qualities that come from 
a different order of being and open us to the infinite horizon of Good. The 
examples of Weil and Stein are primarily intended to stimulate our meta-
physical imagination to think beyond what we can touch and see. Our 
point is to change our attitude towards the various sacrifices that actually 
happen every day. In order not only to look at them from a legal or psy-
chological point of view, but to be able to see a much deeper meaning in 
them, which shapes our sensitivity to the life of another human being, as 
Tischner said, entangled in the maize of good and evil. The metaphysical 
meaning of sacrifice is that it allows us to see and, as it were, understand 
the meaning of our life more fully, which is not limited only to this world 
and to the realization of the needs resulting from its experience. Sacrifice 
reveals to us the perspective of the ultimate meaning, which is a correlate 
of our desire being born in the depths of our soul. The presented delibe‑
rations do not, of course, exhaust the outlined problem situation refer-
ring to the state of metaphysics and the condition of contemporary culture. 
Rather, they are a modest contribution to further research on the condition 
of contemporary culture and humanities, which is experiencing a hunger 
for the presence of high ethical and religious values. Our discussion about 
self‑sacrifice can be concluded with a fragment of the poem by Zbigniew 
Herbert, The power of taste: 
It did not require great character at all
we had a shred of necessary courage
but fundamentally it was a matter of taste
Yes taste
that commands us to get out, to make a wry face, draw out a sneer
even if for this the precious capital of the body,
the head—must fall.
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